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INTRODUCTION
This case tests whether a private-sector Internet company may
regulate the content posted on its platform and enforce rules to prevent the
distribution of abusive, racist, or dangerous content online. Twitter, Inc.
(“Twitter”) adopted the rule at issue here—barring accounts belonging to or
affiliated with violent extremist groups—out of concern that allowing
violent extremists on its platform could “chill[]” the speech of “opponents
and bystanders” and “have dangerous consequences offline.” App’x 694.
It then enforced the rule against Real Parties In Interest Jared Taylor and
New Century Foundation (“Plaintiffs”)—an individual and group described
by public articles cited in their Amended Complaint as proponents of
“crudely white supremacist” ideas. App’x 979. Specifically, Mr. Taylor
“is the founder of” New Century Foundation, which “regularly publishes
proponents of eugenics and blatant anti-black and anti-Latino racists.” Id.
The right of Twitter and other Internet companies to adopt and
enforce such community standards is guaranteed by Section 230 of the
federal Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”) and the First
Amendment. Together, these federal laws protect Twitter’s “exercise of
editorial control and judgment” and safeguard Twitter’s “choice of
material” to disseminate through its platform. Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay,
Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995); see also Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 43 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 230.
10

The Superior Court’s ruling guts these protections. Despite clear
law to the contrary, the decision allows Plaintiffs to challenge Twitter’s rule
barring violent extremist groups based on novel and flawed state-law
theories that, if accepted as a viable basis for litigation, would produce farreaching and significant consequences for the ability of all Internet
companies to adopt and enforce community standards and to protect users.
Allowing this suit to go forward would cause Twitter irreparable
harm by eliminating Twitter’s statutory immunity from the burdens of
litigation. Section 230 confers that immunity precisely to protect and
encourage Twitter’s alleged conduct here—the exercise of editorial
judgment and screening of objectionable content. The Superior Court’s
ruling that Twitter must face the burdens of litigation for exercising those
very functions creates precisely the disincentives that Section 230 aims to
avoid. And it chills protected First Amendment conduct by signaling to
Internet-communications platforms that they should think twice before
updating community standards or removing harassing or abusive content,
lest they provoke a flood of copycat litigation building on the Superior
Court’s unprecedented and unsound theories. Twitter thus seeks immediate
review of the Superior Court’s order and a stay of all proceedings in the
Superior Court pending this Court’s adjudication of Twitter’s petition for
writ relief.
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The Superior Court’s clearly erroneous rulings on the issues of
widespread interest and public importance presented in this case require
this Court’s intervention and warrant granting the writ. See Omaha Indem.
Co. v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1266, 1273-1274 (1989).
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR
PROHIBITION OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF
I.

The Parties
1.

Petitioner Twitter, Inc. is a private-sector Internet

communications platform that users can join and use for free. App’x 399
¶ 16; App’x 417-418 ¶ 62.
2.

Real Party In Interest Jared Taylor is a natural person well

known for his “dissident” views regarding “mainstream thinking on race”
relations, including his belief that members of racial groups have “the right
to choose” to “remain[] the majority in their nation.” App’x 406 ¶ 28;
App’x 407, ¶ 37. Mr. Taylor created a Twitter account in March 2011.
App’x 406 ¶ 29.
3.

Real Party In Interest New Century Foundation is a 501(c)(3)

organization founded by Mr. Taylor in 1994. App’x 398-399 ¶ 13. It
conducts the activities of American Renaissance, a publication founded by
Mr. Taylor to advance his views on race. Id. New Century Foundation
created a Twitter account in June 2011. App’x 406 ¶ 32.
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4.

According to materials cited in their Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs disseminate “crudely white supremacist” views. App’x 979.
Their gatherings are “typically banned from hotels and conference rooms as
soon as the proprietors find out about [their] racist mission.” App’x 983.
II.

Factual Background
5.

Twitter is a free online communications platform. Its

hundreds of millions of users use the platform to share their views, keep
informed about current events, and learn from others. App’x 399 ¶ 16;
App’x 417-418, ¶ 62. Twitter users stay connected by posting and reading
“Tweets,” short messages limited to a certain number of characters. App’x
399 ¶ 16
6.

Twitter’s services are free, but users must agree to Twitter’s

User Agreement, including Twitter’s Terms of Service and the Twitter
Rules. App’x 399 ¶ 16; App’x 401-402 ¶ 19; App’x 523-527; see also
App’x 1004-1011. Together these documents establish guidelines for who
may maintain an account and what type of content can be shared. App’x
430-431 ¶¶ 97-98.
7.

An overarching goal of these community standards is to

protect user safety online. While Twitter aims to give “everyone … the
power to create and share ideas instantly, without barriers,” Twitter also
recognizes that “freedom of expression and open dialogue … mean[] little

13

as an underlying philosophy if voices are silenced because people are afraid
to speak up.” App’x 1005, 1007.
8.

At the time Plaintiffs joined the platform in June 2011,

Twitter’s Terms of Service “reserve[d] the right at all times … to remove or
refuse to distribute any Content on the Services and to terminate users or
reclaim user names.” App’x 993, 1000. Later versions of the Terms of
Service included an additional, overlapping provision stating that “[w]e
may suspend or terminate your accounts or cease providing you with all or
part of the Services at any time for any or no reason.” App’x 430-431 ¶ 97;
e.g., App’x 611, 668.
9.

As of June 2011, the Twitter Rules—a three-page, plain-

English document—stated that Twitter “will not censor user content, except
in limited circumstances” described in a list of exceptions that, at the time,
did not include affiliation with a violent extremist group as a basis for
suspension. App’x 524-526. The very next paragraph after that statement,
however, said that to “make Twitter a better experience for all … [w]e may
need to change these rules from time to time and reserve the right to do so.
Please check back [to the webpage hosting the Rules] to see the latest.”
App’x 524.
10.

On November 17, 2017, Twitter announced “updated … rules

around abuse and hateful conduct as well as violence and physical harm,”
to be enforced “starting December 18.” App’x 986; see also App’x 68714

695. This update added the Violent Extremist Group Rule, which states
that users “may not affiliate with organizations that—whether by their own
statements or activity both on and off the platform—use or promote
violence against civilians to further their causes.” App’x 694. Twitter
explained that this rule against violent extremist groups was necessary
because allowing violent extremists on its platform could “chill[]” the
speech of “opponents and bystanders” and “have dangerous consequences
offline.” Id.
11.

The Amended Complaint alleges that on December 18, 2017,

Twitter suspended Plaintiffs’ Twitter accounts and informed them that the
accounts were permanently suspended “because the accounts were ‘found
to be violating … the Twitter Rules against being affiliated with a violent
extremist group.’” App’x 410-411 ¶¶ 45-46.
III.

Procedural History
12.

Plaintiffs filed this suit in February 2018 and amended their

complaint a month later. They seek a broad injunction, purportedly “on
behalf of themselves, others similarly situated, and the general public,”
ordering Twitter to reinstate their accounts, to cease enforcing “its facially
overbroad policy on ‘Violent Extremist Groups,’” and to cease
“suspend[ing] or ban[ning] users based on the user’s viewpoint or
perceived affiliations.” App’x 395; App’x 409.
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13.

The Amended Complaint raised three claims. First, it

asserted that Twitter violated Plaintiffs’ rights of speech and association
under the California Constitution by suspending Plaintiffs’ accounts based
on Plaintiffs’ political views. App’x 415-427 ¶¶ 58-84. Second, it alleged
that Twitter violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by “intentionally
target[ing]” Plaintiffs’ accounts based on “their controversial political
views” and “perceived political affiliations (e.g., as ‘far right,’ ‘alt right,’
and ‘extremist’).” App’x 427-430 ¶¶ 85-94. Finally—in the claim at issue
here—it asserted that Twitter violated California’s Unfair Competition
Law, which prohibits “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or
practices,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, by allegedly “inserting
unconscionable terms in its [user agreement] and deceptively advertising
itself as a forum for free speech.” App’x 415 ¶ 57; App’x 430-435 ¶¶ 95111.
14.

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Twitter acted fraudulently

in violation of the UCL by publicly portraying itself as a wide-open haven
for free speech (such as by describing itself as “the free speech wing of the
free speech party”), informing users in the June 2011 Twitter Rules that it
“w[ould] not censor user content” except in limited circumstances, and
promising that it would not make “retroactive” changes to its policies. E.g.,
App’x 395 ¶ 1; App’x 434 ¶ 109.
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15.

Plaintiffs also alleged that Twitter’s user agreement was

unlawful under the UCL because it violated the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act’s (“CLRA”) prohibition against “‘[i]nserting an unconscionable
provision in [a] contract.’” App’x 431 ¶¶ 99-100. Plaintiffs identified no
theory of unlawfulness under the UCL other than the alleged violation of
the CLRA.
16.

On April 24, 2018, Twitter filed a demurrer arguing that

Section 230 of the CDA and the First Amendment each bar Plaintiffs’
claims at the threshold and that Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a claim on
their own terms. Specifically, Twitter contended that Section 230 barred
Plaintiffs’ three claims because they all sought to hold Twitter liable for
blocking user-generated content. App’x 956-957; see also Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune
under section 230.”). And Twitter explained that the First Amendment also
bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims because they impinge on Twitter’s right to
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exercise editorial control in creating a safe environment for its user. App’x
957-960.1
17.

Twitter’s demurrer also explained that all of Plaintiffs’ claims

also failed on their face, as a matter of California law. With respect to the
UCL claim that is the focus of this petition, Twitter demonstrated that each
of the theories for a UCL violation pleaded in the Amended Complaint—
one based on alleged fraud by Twitter, the other based on alleged
unlawfulness in the Twitter user agreement—was fatally defective.
18.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL’s fraud theory, Twitter’s

demurrer explained that the Amended Complaint failed to identify any
specific statements by Twitter indicating its general support for free speech
on its platform amounted to a factual representation that the company
would never ban specific users. App’x 966-969. As for the statement in
the 2011 Rules about the circumstances in which Twitter will censor user
content, the demurrer pointed out that there was nothing false about that
statement, either when it was written or more generally. App’x 966.
19.

Twitter’s demurrer also explained that the Plaintiffs’ UCL

unconscionability theory failed as a matter of California law. The only

1

Twitter also filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied on the
ground that Plaintiffs’ suit fell within the public-interest exception to antiSLAPP challenges in California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17(b).
App’x. 1334-1335. Twitter does not challenge that ruling here.
18

purported unlawful act discussed in the Amended Complaint was an alleged
violation of the CLRA’s prohibition on unconscionable terms in certain
types of contracts. App’x 966. The demurrer argued that this case does not
even implicate the CLRA because Twitter offers a free service and the
CLRA extends only to “‘acts or practices undertaken by any person in a
transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or
services to any consumer.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)).
Moreover, Twitter explained that it had not made a retroactive change to its
user agreement. As one of Plaintiffs’ own exhibits stated, the Violent
Extremist Group Rule was announced the month before it took effect.
App’x 967 (citing App’x 687-692).
20.

The Superior Court held a hearing on Twitter’s demurrer on

June 14, 2018. At the beginning of the hearing, the court issued a brief oral
tentative ruling. App’x 1334-1336.
21.

The Superior Court sustained Twitter’s demurrer without

leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ California Constitution and Unruh Act
claims, holding them barred by Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA. App’x
1335. Plaintiffs did not object to this ruling. App’x 1336.
22.

Over Twitter’s objections, the Superior Court overruled

Twitter’s demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. See App’x 1335; App’x
1343-1366. Regarding Twitter’s threshold federal-law defenses, the court
concluded that Section 230 does not apply to a UCL claim. App’x 1335;
19

App’x 1350-1353; App’x 1360. Although the court recognized that Section
230(c)(1) “covers precisely the allegations in the first and second causes of
actions,” App’x 1335—i.e., the claims that directly challenged Twitter’s
actions in banning Plaintiffs allegedly on the basis of their political views—
the court thought the UCL claim “has nothing to do with viewpoint
discrimination,” but instead concerns only “contract principle[s]” against
unconscionability and deception, which the court viewed as outside the
scope of Section 230. App’x 1350; App’x 1353; App’x 1360. For similar
reasons, the court held that the First Amendment also does not bar the UCL
claim, suggesting that the First Amendment does not allow Twitter to
reserve the right in its user agreement to remove users based on their views
or objectionable content. App’x 1335.
23.

The Superior Court also held, over Twitter’s objections, that

Plaintiffs’ UCL claim states a viable cause of action under state law. With
respect to the contention that Twitter acted fraudulently in violation of the
UCL, the court concluded that Plaintiffs had stated a viable claim that
Twitter made misleading or deceptive statements by suggesting that its
platform “is open to everybody of all viewpoints” subject only to limited
enumerated exceptions. App’x 1359. In support of that claim, Plaintiffs
identified only one allegedly fraudulent statement that was neither a
statement of opinion nor a generalized statement that no reasonable person
could possibly be misled by, see App’x 1362-1364 (citing App’x 408-409 ¶
20

40 & App’x 523-527)—namely, Twitter’s statement in the June 2011
Twitter Rules, quoted in the Amended Complaint, that:
Our goal is to provide a service that allows you to discover
and receive content from sources that interest you as well as
to share your content with others. We respect the ownership
of content that users share and each user is responsible for the
content that he or she provides. Because of these principles,
we do not actively monitor user’s content and will not censor
user content, except in the limited circumstances described
below.
App’x 408 ¶ 40 (citing App’x 524). The court found that statement to be a
sufficient basis for pleading a “fraudulent” act under the UCL because the
enumerated exceptions to the alleged promise “not [to] censor user content”
did not at the time include the Violent Extremist Group Rule and thus, in
the court’s view, did not “cover viewpoint discrimination” of the type
Plaintiffs allege. App’x 1365.
24.

Twitter pointed out that the very next paragraph of the 2011

Twitter Rules, immediately following the statement quoted in the Amended
Complaint and relied on by the Superior Court, stated that “[w]e may need
to change these rules from time to time and reserve the right to do so.
Please check back here to see the latest.” App’x 524; see App’x 1364.
Twitter also pointed out that the same three-page document informed users
that “Twitter reserves the right to immediately terminate your account,
without further notice, in the event that, in its judgment, you violate these
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rules or the terms of service.” App’x 1364 (quoting App’x 526); see also
App’x 1359-1360.
25.

The Superior Court determined that it could not consider

Twitter’s counter-points. The court stated that on a demurrer it was “only
allowed to look at the first amended complaint” itself and could not
consider “material[s]” outside the text of the Amended Complaint unless
they were judicially noticeable, App’x 1360-1361—including the additional
language in the June 2011 Twitter Rules on which Twitter asked the court
to focus. Thus, even though that language was set forth in an exhibit
Plaintiffs had attached to their Amended Complaint, the court held that it
had to be ignored at this stage. App’x 1364-1366 (“We’re only on a
demurrer.”).
26.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ alternative theory that Twitter’s user

agreement is unlawful under the UCL because it includes an allegedly
unconscionable provision in violation of the CLRA, the Superior Court
recognized that Twitter was “probably right” that the Amended Complaint
does not allege a viable CLRA/unlawfulness claim. App’x 1344. But
rather than reach that issue, the court identified—and found that Plaintiffs
could proceed on—different unconscionability theories (untethered to the
CLRA) that the court acknowledged were not even mentioned in the
Amended Complaint. Id. Focusing on “certain aspects of th[e] claim that
the plaintiffs themselves did not identify,” App’x 1343, the court held the
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Amended Complaint could be understood to assert a viable claim that
Twitter’s user agreement violates either California Civil Code § 1670.5’s
bar on unconscionable contract provisions or at least “common law”
unconscionability principles. App’x 1335; App’x 1345.
27.

Specifically, the court reasoned that the provision of the

current Twitter user agreement—which the Court described as a “prolix”
document—allowing Twitter to suspend a user’s account for “any or no
reason” is arguably unconscionable, both procedurally and substantively.
The court found the provision to be arguably procedurally unconscionable
because Twitter, while allegedly knowing its platform to be a highly
important medium for public discourse, nonetheless imposed the “any or no
reason” provision on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. App’x 1348-1349. The
court further found it to be arguably substantively unconscionable for
Twitter “to deprive people of the most important platform to speak and to
be able to seek redress of their legislators.” App’x 1348.
28.

Because these unconscionability theories had not been

presented in any filings, Twitter repeatedly requested the opportunity to
submit supplemental briefing addressing them. App’x 1344; App’x 1345;
App’x 1351. The Superior Court denied the request. E.g., App’x 1345.
29.

On July 11, 2018, the Superior Court issued a formal order on

Twitter’s demurrer, which duplicated its tentative ruling.
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IV.

Basis For Relief
30.

The Superior Court committed multiple clear errors of law

when it overruled Twitter’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. In
doing so, the Superior Court laid out a roadmap for any litigant seeking to
circumvent the rights of an online platform under Section 230 and the First
Amendment: Simply file an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) suit claiming
either that (A) the litigant was deceived into believing that the platform’s
community standards would remain static from the moment the litigant first
joined the platform or (B) it is unconscionable for the platform to have
memorialized its rights under Section 230 and First Amendment to adapt its
rules over time.
31.

This approach cannot be squared with Section 230 or the First

Amendment. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is that Twitter cannot
reserve its right as a publisher to establish, modify, and enforce rules
governing the content it disseminates. The First Amendment protects
Twitter’s editorial discretion to do exactly that, and Section 230 immunizes
Twitter from liability and litigation—regardless of how the claims are
styled—concerning Twitter’s exercise of that discretion. The Superior
Court correctly recognized these principles in dismissing Plaintiffs’
California Constitution and Unruh Act claims under Section 230. The
Superior Court’s failure to dismiss the UCL claims based on these same
federal law principles constituted grave legal error.
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32.

Even as a matter of state law, the Superior Court’s rulings

with respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim were incorrect. It cannot possibly be
fraudulent for a private-sector Internet company to maintain rules
regulating its platform and to adjust those rules as needed to account for
new or changing circumstances—particularly where that company, like
Twitter, has consistently advised users that it “may need to change these
rules from time to time.” App’x 524; see also App’x 1005. And it cannot
possibly be unconscionable for a contractual provision to restate a
background legal right that one party already enjoys. But under the
Superior Court’s reasoning, Twitter’s ability to control the content
distributed through its platform—control that enables Twitter to protect
users from outrageous or disruptive content—would be forever frozen in
place by the particular rules in place at the moment a particular user joined
the platform, even though Twitter expressly advised users that it could
change the rules.
V.

Satisfaction Of General Grounds For Writ Review and Grounds
For A Stay of Proceedings
33.

Twitter would suffer irreparable injury if the writ were not

issued. Specifically, Twitter’s immunity from suit conferred under Section
230—immunity intended to protect it from the burdens of litigation—
would be rendered meaningless if it were forced to wait for a final
judgment before appealing. Moreover, if the Superior Court’s denial of
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immunity were left in place, the decision would provide—and indeed has
already begun to provide—a template for copycat suits against Twitter and
other Internet companies, further undermining Twitter’s immunity from
suit.
34.

Many of the traditional factors that favor granting a writ are

met here. First, this case involves an issue of widespread public interest
because the Superior Court’s novel reasoning would apply to any
communications platform based in California that hosts third-party content.
Second, this case presents an issue of the first impression for this Court and
one on which the only two superior courts to consider the question have
split. Third, granting the writ would finally dispose of this case, saving
both the parties and the courts from expending further time and resources
on meritless litigation.
35.

Moreover, an extraordinary writ is necessary because there is

no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.”
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086. Twitter is barred from appealing the trial
court’s order overruling its demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim until final
judgment is entered. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 901-914; see also Bank of
Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 2d 697, 701 (1942).
36.

Petitioner Twitter has a “beneficial interest[]” in the lawsuit,

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086, because the Superior Court’s ruling directly
affects its ability to control the speech disseminated on its platform, see
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California Hosp. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 188 Cal. App. 4th 559, 569
(2010).
37.

This petition is timely because it is filed 26 days after entry of

the Superior Court’s order, well under the 60-day presumptive time limit
for writ relief. E.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. App.
4th 695, 701-702 (2001).
38.

Twitter also satisfies the criteria for obtaining a temporary

stay of all proceedings in the Superior Court while this Court considers this
petition for writ relief. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.486(a)(7) (petition for stay must
“explain the urgency”). It is urgent that the Court grant such a stay
because, as explained in the accompanying memorandum, the benefits of
Twitter’s Section 230 immunity from suit would be irrevocably lost if this
case were to move forward below. See supra pp. 54-57. If Twitter’s
request for a temporary stay were not granted, Twitter would soon be
required to file an answer (currently due on August 10, 2018) and otherwise
devote extensive time and resources to pretrial proceedings, including
discovery. These are precisely the types of burdens that immunity defenses
are intended to guard against. See Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v.
Superior Ct., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1189 (2005) (“An immunity defense
is effectively lost if an immune party is forced to stand trial or face the
other burdens of litigation.” (emphasis added)). And it is well settled that
Section 230 protects entities such as Twitter not only from liability, but
27

from the burdens of litigation. In similar circumstances involving
immunity defenses, Courts of Appeal have granted stays pending writ
review. See, e.g., County of L.A. v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 4th 218,
225 (2009); Big Valley Band, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1189. Twitter
respectfully submits that a stay is likewise appropriate in this case.
PRAYER
Petitioners pray that that this Court:
1.

Issue an order (1) staying the Superior Court’s order

overruling in part Twitter’s demurrer and (2) staying further litigation
pending a ruling on Twitter’s petition for writ of mandate and/or
prohibition or other appropriate relief.
2.

Issue a writ of mandate and/or prohibition directing the

Superior Court to:

3.

a)

Vacate the portion of its order overruling Twitter’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action; and

b)

Issue a new order sustaining in full Twitter’s demurrer
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without leave to
amend.

Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.
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VERIFICATION

I, Mark D. Flanagan, declare as follows:
I am one of the attorneys for Petitioner. I have read the foregoing
Petition for Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief
and know its contents. The facts alleged in the petition are within my own
knowledge, and I know these facts to be true. Because of my familiarity
with the relevant facts pertaining to the trial court proceedings, I, rather
than Petitioner, verify this petition.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in New York,
New York on August 3, 2018.
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

Standard Of Review
A writ of mandate should be granted where, based on undisputed

facts, “it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion,” or that
“‘discretion can be exercised in only one way’” that the trial court failed to
follow. Robbins v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. 3d 199, 205 (1985); see also Fair
Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 629, 411-412
(2004) (granting writ of mandate where trial court improperly overruled a
demurrer). A ruling that rests on legal error is “outside the scope of [the
court’s] discretion” and subject to de novo review on a writ of mandate.
Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 194 Cal. App. 4th 288,
300 (2011) (citing Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 124
Cal. App. 4th 762, 768 (2004)); see also Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 115
Cal. App. 4th at 412 (“pure question of law” is reviewed de novo).
A writ of mandate “must be issued in all cases where there is not a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of the law.”
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1086 (emphasis added). Typically, a petitioner must
demonstrate: (1) that it has no right to an immediate appeal; and (2) that it
would suffer “irreparable injury” (i.e., harm or prejudice that cannot be
corrected on appeal) if the writ were not granted. Los Angeles Gay &
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Lesbian Ctr., 194 Cal. App. 4th at 299-300.2 Other circumstances can
independently warrant immediate interlocutory review, including (1)
“widespread interest” in the issues raised by the petition, Brandt v. Superior
Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 813, 816 (1985); (2) conflicting views in the lower courts on
those issues, id.; (3) a significant issue of first impression in the petition,
Casterson v. Superior Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 177, 182 (2002); and (4) the
prospect that resolving the issue or issues in the petition might finally
dispose of the underlying case, id. California courts have granted writs of
mandate in some cases based solely on these additional factors without
considering the “irreparable harm” standard. E.g., id. at 182 (writ review
warranted where petition raised an issue of first impression and resolution
would result in a final disposition as to petitioner); Noe v. Superior Ct., 237
Cal. App. 4th 316, 325 (2015) (writ review appropriate where petition
presented significant issue of first impression); Pugliese v. Superior Ct. 146
Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1448 (2007) (same).

2

It is indisputable that Twitter has the requisite “beneficial[]
interest[]” in the lawsuit since the ruling below directly affects its ability to
control the content disseminated on its platform. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1086.
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II.

The Superior Court Committed Grave Errors Of Law In Ruling
That Plaintiffs Stated An Actionable UCL Claim
A.

The UCL Claim Is Barred By The First Amendment And
Section 230

In sustaining Twitter’s demurrer as to the California Constitution
and Unruh Act claims, the Superior Court correctly recognized that 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) protects Twitter from “precisely” those claims that seek
to attack its control over the content it disseminates on its platform. App’x
1335. The same analysis should have disposed of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.
The gravamen of that claim is that Twitter cannot reserve its right as a
publisher to set and enforce rules governing what or whose content it will
or will not distribute through its platform. But that is a core First
Amendment right; and Section 230 was enacted precisely to encourage
platforms to actively self-regulate third-party content and immunizes
Twitter for that conduct. The Superior Court committed clear error in
overruling Twitter’s demurrer.
Twitter’s decisions on what or whose content to distribute are
quintessential editorial judgments protected by the First Amendment. A
private-sector communications platform cannot be compelled to
disseminate a message it finds objectionable solely because its decision to
exclude the message would deprive another of a private platform from
which to speak. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-570. The First Amendment
safeguards the “choice of material … [that]—whether fair or unfair—
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constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Id. at 575.
Thus, a newspaper cannot be forced to publish op-eds with which it
disagrees or simply wishes to exclude, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1974), and private citizens organizing a
parade on city streets cannot be compelled “to include among the marchers
a group imparting a message that organizers do not wish to convey,”
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
The Superior Court perceived a distinction between claims that
directly challenged Twitter’s removal of user content and those that
concerned only “contract principle[s]” regulating Twitter’s covenants with
its users. App’x 1353. But Twitter’s reservation of its rights to modify its
rules governing user content and to suspend users who violate those rules is
no less central to Twitter’s fundamental right to engage in expressive
speech than its acts of removing user content.
Twitter’s adoption and enforcement of a rule barring users affiliated
with organizations that “identify … as an extremist group” and “use or
promote violence against civilians to further their causes,” App’x 694,
constitutes protected expression by Twitter in at least two respects. First,
adopting and enforcing that rule conveys Twitter’s view that extremist
violence is unacceptable. Second, it declares Twitter’s unwillingness to
serve as a medium for content that could chill the speech of other users of
its platform or lead to dangerous consequences offline. Like the parade
33

organizers in Hurley, Twitter’s “clear[] deci[sion] to exclude a message it
did not like from the communication it chose to make” suffices to “invoke
its right[s] as a private speaker” under the First Amendment. Id.
Section 230 likewise guarantees platforms like Twitter the freedom
to self-regulate third-party content on their platforms. Indeed, as the
California Supreme Court has recognized, that is one of Section 230’s
primary objectives: “to promote active screening by service providers of
online content provided by others.” Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 53
(2006). Congress “contemplat[ed] [that] self-regulation” would best
achieve that objective, “rather than regulation compelled at the sword point
of tort liability.” Id. Section 230 thus “broadly shield[s] all providers from
liability for ‘publishing’ information received from third parties,” id., in
order to “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies” that can be used to block
“objectionable or inappropriate online material,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
More specifically, Section 230(c)(1) immunizes interactive computer
service providers like Twitter from liability for their “exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content” created by third parties.
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 43. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has explained, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding
whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce
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immune under section 230.” Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1170-1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Numerous courts
have thus held that blocking or removing a plaintiff’s posts or, as is alleged
here, suspending a plaintiff’s account, qualifies as “publisher conduct
immunized by the CDA.” Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F.
Supp. 3d 1088, 1094-1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 526 (9th
Cir. 2017); Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 444 F. App’x 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Section 230(c)(1) immunizes “decisions to delete [plaintiff’s] user
profiles”); Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., 2016 WL 3648608, at *2-3 (N.D.
Cal. July 8, 2016) (claims arising from platform’s removal of plaintiff’s
videos barred by Section 230(c)(1)).
In short, the provisions of Twitter’s rules and terms of service that
the Superior Court found actionable simply make manifest Twitter’s
established fundamental rights under the First Amendment and Section 230
to exercise editorial judgment. And as courts across the country have held,
a provision of a contract that states expressly that a party has a right it
would have even in the absence of the provision cannot possibly be
unconscionable. E.g., Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d
221, 234 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Quilloin fails to explain how a process allowing
any employee the full amount of time permitted under law is
unconscionable[.]”); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x
403, 407 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the [provision allowing banks to set
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off debts owed by the depositor against funds in the account] is explicitly
permitted by North Carolina law, the set-off provision is not
unconscionable.”); Abeyrama v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2012 WL
2393063, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2012) (“The arbitration agreements’
incorporation of rights that exist under state law cannot be deemed
unconscionable.”).3 And it cannot be fraudulent for Twitter to tell its users
that it intends to exercise the discretion reserved to it under Section 230 and
the First Amendment by ensuring that its rules remain consistent with
Twitter’s views about what content is acceptable. Twitter’s rights of
editorial control and self-regulation would mean little if the act of
informing users of those rights could be actionably misleading.
Plaintiffs’ UCL claim thus should have been dismissed at the
threshold for the same reasons that their claims under the California
Constitution and the Unruh Act failed. Like those claims, the UCL claim
attacks Twitter’s Violent Extremist Group Rule for “allowing Twitter, a

3

See also Evans v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 2006 WL
213740, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2006) (“[T]he Court finds that the
[contractual] terms are not unconscionable because they are specifically
authorized by statute.”); Goldstein v. S&A Rest. Corp., 622 F. Supp. 139,
143-144 (D.D.C. 1985) (the fact that “agreements [that] did not diminish
any rights that plaintiff possessed prior to the execution of those
agreements” showed that the agreements were not unconscionable); Dillard
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th
Cir. 1992) (“[A]greements to arbitrate disputes in accordance with SECapproved procedures are not unconscionable as a matter of law.”).
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public forum under the … California Constitution that is required to respect
the free speech rights of the public, to censor and ban users based solely on
their political beliefs and affiliations.” App’x 433 ¶ 105. Plaintiffs
themselves allege that their UCL claim “seeks to enforce the speech and
petition rights of the general public.” App’x 415 ¶ 56. And the relief
Plaintiffs request seeks not to compel Twitter to alter the “any or no
reason” provision or issue a public correction of its purportedly fraudulent
statements, but to enjoin Twitter to reinstate Plaintiffs’ accounts, stop
enforcing its “facially over-broad policy on Violent Extremist Groups,” and
“cease and desist … suspend[ing] or bann[ing] user accounts based on the
user’s viewpoint or perceived political affiliations.” App’x 435-436.
“[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action,” but the substance
of the claim and “whether the duty” the plaintiff seeks to enforce “derives
from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” Barnes
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Section
230). Here, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim in substance embodies a rejection of
Twitter’s rights under Section 230 and the First Amendment and impinges
on its protected expression and editorial judgment no differently than their
other claims. The UCL claim should therefore have been dismissed with
prejudice.
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B.

The Amended Complaint Fails To State An Actionable
UCL Claim For Several Additional Reasons The Superior
Court Either Did Not Consider Or Erroneously Rejected

Even setting aside the Superior Court’s analysis of Section 230 and the
First Amendment, the court independently committed serious errors of law
in overruling Twitter’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. Each of the
UCL theories that the Superior Court deemed to be viable is fundamentally
flawed as a matter of California law. That the Superior Court was forced to
distort state doctrine in order to allow Plaintiffs’ claims to survive makes it
all the more important that this Court grant the present petition in order to
prevent the underlying action from proceeding at the expense of Twitter’s
Section 230 immunity and First Amendment rights.
1.

The Superior Court Erred In Sustaining Plaintiffs’
UCL “Fraud” Theory

The Superior Court committed clear legal error in concluding that
Plaintiffs alleged a viable claim that Twitter engaged in fraudulent acts or
practices in violation of the UCL. To prevail on that theory, Plaintiffs must
show that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by specifically
identified allegedly fraudulent statements. In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.
4th 298, 312 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). As the First District has
held, this inquiry focuses on “ordinary consumer[s] acting reasonably under
the circumstances.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th
496, 512 (2003).
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At the hearing on Twitter’s demurrer, Twitter argued that the
statements by Twitter or its representatives that Plaintiffs claim were
fraudulent were in fact too general, vague, or non-factual to support a claim
under the UCL’s fraud prong. The court directly asked Plaintiffs to identify
any specific alleged statements that did not suffer from that shortcoming.
App’x 1362-1364. In response, Plaintiffs focused exclusively on one: the
statement in the June 2011 Twitter Rules stating that Twitter “will not
censor user content[] except in the limited circumstances described below.”
See App’x 524; see also App’x 1363-1366; App’x 408 ¶ 40; supra p. 41.
The Superior Court embraced Plaintiffs’ argument that this
statement is actionable under the UCL fraud prong, but that was plainly
wrong as a matter of law. In particular, when read in context—as the law
requires but which the court erroneously found it could not do—no
reasonable consumer could be misled by that statement.4
Significantly, Plaintiffs attached to their Amended Complaint the
full text of the three-page Rules document containing the “will not censor”
statement. App’x 523-527. By doing so, Plaintiffs necessarily

4

Plaintiffs also failed to plead that they actually relied on this
purportedly fraudulent statement (likely because they did not). See In re
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 325. Plaintiffs do not allege that Twitter’s
allegedly fraudulent statements induced them to join or stay on the platform
when they otherwise “in all reasonable probability” would not have. Id. at
326. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that they made frequent and
advantageous use of the platform. App’x. 406-407 ¶ 33.
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incorporated that document by reference. This meant, “[f]or purposes of a
demurrer,” that the court must “accept as true … [the] facts appearing in”
the exhibit. E.g., Mead v. Sanwa Bank, 61 Cal. App. 4th 561, 567-568
(1998); see also Savings Bank of San Diego Cty. v. Burns, 104 Cal. 473,
477 (1894) (“An exhibit, as attached to the complaint, forms a part of it,
and must be so treated, [even if] no express words declaring it to be so are
used.”). In particular, to the extent “facts appearing in the attached exhibit
contradict those expressly pleaded, those in the exhibit are given
precedence.” Mead, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 568.
Here, the statement in the June 2011 Rules on which Plaintiffs
exclusively focused and which the Superior Court deemed actionable was
followed immediately by a warning that Twitter “may need to change these
rules from time to time and reserve[s] the right to do so.” App’x 524. The
Rules document also instructed the user to “check back here [i.e., the
webpage that hosts the Rules] to see the latest.” Id. Here is an image of the
relevant portion of the rules—as appended to the Amended Complaint—
with the provision on which Plaintiffs and the court relied highlighted in
blue and the provisions that the Superior Court refused to consider
highlighted in yellow:
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App’x 524. Immediately after the yellow-highlighted sentence followed
the specific rules that were then in force and that spelled out “limited
circumstances” in which Twitter might censor user content.
The language highlighted above in yellow made it obvious to any
ordinary reader that the “limited circumstances” under which Twitter would
refuse to disseminate content could change or expand in the future. And in
light of this clear qualifier, the “will not censor” language on which
Plaintiffs and the Superior Court focused cannot possibly be misleading.
There can be no deception when “qualifying language appears immediately
next to the representations it qualifies and no reasonable reader [can] ignore
it.” Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289-290 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Simpson v. Kroger Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1371-1372 (2013)
(where “the top and side panels of the tubs” containing butter substitute
included labels informing the consumer “that the products contain both
butter and canola or olive oil … [n]o reasonable person could purchase
these products believing they had purchased a product containing only
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butter”); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 87 Cal. App. 4th 364, 375-376
(2001) (brochure related to Blue Cross’s medical plan not misleading where
the “brochure carefully explain[ed]” the statement plaintiff alleged was
fraudulent).
The Legislature could not have intended the UCL to bar a privatesector communications platform from being able to modify its user rules to
reflect changing circumstances and protect users from new or changing
sources of harm, particularly where (as here) the platform expressly
reserved the right to do so. See California Sch. Employees Ass’n v.
Governing Bd., 8 Cal. 4th 333, 340 (1994) (a court should not interpret a
statute to “lead to absurd results”); see also Smith v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal.
4th 77, 83 (2006) (when a statute is ambiguous, “we choose the
construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent
intent, … avoiding a construction that would lead to absurd
consequences”); Purifoy v. Howell, 183 Cal. App. 4th 166, 175 (2010)
(same).
The construction of the UCL fraud prong adopted by the Superior
Court, if left standing, would harm the public interest. If communications
platforms like Twitter faced the threat of actionable claims and the burdens
of litigation every time they sought to make even minor adjustments to their
user agreements and community standards, they would likely be deterred
from responsibly self-regulating content distributed through their
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platforms—to the detriment of users and society. See Hassell v. Bird, 5
Cal. 5th 522, ___, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867, 885 (2018) (plurality op.) (“An
injunction … can impose substantial burdens on an Internet intermediary …
and could interfere with and undermine the viability of an online
platform.”).
Finally, a further reason to reject the Superior Court’s construction
of the UCL’s fraud prong as applicable here is that it would trench on
Twitter’s exercise of its authority—protected by the First Amendment and
Section 230—to decide what content to publish or omit on its platform. See
supra pp. 32-37; Field v. Bowen, 199 Cal. App. 4th 346, 355 (2011) (“If a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which renders it
constitutional and the other … raises serious and doubtful constitutional
questions[], the court will adopt the construction which will render it free
from doubt as to its constitutionality.”); Jevne v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.
4th 935, 949 (2005) (“State law that conflicts with a federal statute is
‘without effect.’”).
Twitter presented all of these arguments to the Superior Court. See
App’x 1360-1366. The Superior Court disregarded them, apparently
because it believed it could not consider the full text of the 2011 Twitter
Rules in making its ruling. On demurrer, the Superior Court explained, it
could only “look at the first amended complaint and anything that is
judicially noticeable.” App’x 1360-1361; App’x 1366 (“We’re only on a
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demurrer. I have to accept the well-pled allegations [of the Amended
Complaint.]”). According to the Superior Court, consideration of other
“evidence” or “material[s]” would have to wait for a later stage of
litigation—apparently without regard to whether those materials are
incorporated in or attached to the Amended Complaint. App’x 1360-1361.
But as explained above, this is wrong as a matter of law. See supra pp. 3940. The Superior Court could and should have considered the full text of
the June 2011 Twitter Rules, which show that the one and only specific
statement Plaintiffs cited as fraudulent at the June 14 hearing could not
possibly be found misleading. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s
conclusion that Plaintiffs stated a viable claim of fraudulent conduct under
the UCL was clearly erroneous.
2.

The Superior Court Erred In Sustaining An
Unconscionability Theory

The Superior Court alternatively ruled that Plaintiffs stated a claim
under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL on a legal theory that Plaintiffs
themselves did not allege: that the provision in Twitter’s terms of service
“to the effect that Twitter can, at any time, for any reason, or no reason, pull
any account” is unconscionable under either California Civil Code § 1670.5
or the common law. App’x 1347; see also App’x 1350-1351 (the UCL
claim “says that it is unconscionable for Twitter to reserve [its] right to
revoke anybody’s ability to be on the platform for any reason at all”);
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App’x 619 (relevant Terms of Service provision). For several reasons in
addition to Twitter’s federal-law defenses, the court erred as a matter of law
in sustaining this theory.
a)

The “any or no reason” provision is not
unconscionable as a matter of law

First, a contract term cannot be unconscionable where the party that
includes the term in the contract is offering a service for free or if a
customer who did not agree with the provision could simply choose to use a
different service. Unconscionability has both “substantive” and
“procedural” elements, with the former focusing on “overly harsh or onesided results,” and the latter focusing on “oppression or surprise due to
unequal bargaining power.” Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). Both
elements “must be present” for a court to find unconscionability. Id. But
neither element meaningfully exists here.
Twitter’s user agreement is not substantively unconscionable
because it is “not so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” Pinnacle
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev., LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223, 246
(2012) (“A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it
merely gives one side a greater benefit[.]”). A provision in a user
agreement that gives a communications platform “sole discretion” to
remove content and “discontinue any aspect of [its] Service at any time”
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does not satisfy this high bar when the underlying service is free. See
Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 7753406, at *2-3, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 2, 2015). Given the value that the Twitter service provides to its
users—which the Amended Complaint itself attests to be very great, e.g.,
App’x 406-407 ¶ 33—and given that Twitter users generally pay no money
at all to receive that value, it is appropriate and fair for Twitter both to
impose conditions on how the service may be used and to reserve to itself
an unfettered right to not provide, or to stop providing, the service to any or
all users. In short, the “any or no reason” provision on which the Superior
Court focused strikes an appropriate balance between the company and the
user.
As courts have recognized in cases concerning other Internet
companies that provide communications services at no charge to their
users, Twitter’s ability to provide a communications service for free
depends in part on its ability to include in its standardized user agreement
“provisions and protections” such as the one at issue here. Song fi, Inc. v.
Google Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 53, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2014). Such contract terms
eliminate or control costs of doing business that Twitter would otherwise
face—for example, by ensuring that it does not have to litigate every
decision it makes about who can use its platform. Terms such as this
thereby “‘make it possible for [Twitter] to provide [a platform] for free to
hundreds of millions of users around the world.’” Id. at 64. For this
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reason, courts “routinely enforce” contract terms that allow providers of
free communications services to “modify the Terms [of Service],
discontinue service, or remove content unilaterally.” See id. In light of the
substantial benefits Twitter’s users receive for no charge, it is “reasonable
for [Twitter] to retain broad discretion over these services.” E.g., Darnaa,
2015 WL 7753406, at *2-3.
Here, Plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain. They were
permitted to use Twitter for years without ever having to pay any fee.
App’x 406 ¶¶ 29-32. They used the Twitter platform to build their own
businesses, employing Twitter to drive “traffic to [their] websites” and
“alert” their supporters to “their recent publications, forthcoming
conferences, public appearances, articles, videos, podcasts, and their
commentary on the news of the day.” App’x 406-407 ¶ 33. Having “taken
advantage of [Twitter’s] free services,” Plaintiffs cannot complain that
contractual terms that reduce Twitter’s costs, and thus enabled Twitter to
provide those services for free, are unenforceable. Song fi, 72 F. Supp. 3d
at 64.
Nor is Twitter’s user agreement procedurally unconscionable. The
“adhesive nature of a contract” standing alone “does not mean that [the]
contract will not be enforced.” Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 61 Cal.
4th 899, 915 (2015). Indeed, using an adhesion contract is unavoidable in
this context given the scope of Twitter’s user base. It would be impossible
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to negotiate the terms of use with each of Twitter’s hundreds of millions of
users.
Moreover, as the First District has explained, even when a consumer
is handed a take-it-or-leave it agreement, “the existence of ‘meaningful’
alternatives available to such contracting party in the form of other sources
of supply tends to defeat any claim of” procedural unconscionability. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 771 (1989).
That is true even where available “alternatives [are] less desirable” or
“inferior.” E.g., Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App.
4th 1224, 1246 (2007).
In Darnaa, for example, the plaintiff argued that it was procedurally
unconscionable for YouTube to require users to agree to terms similar to
the “any or no reason” provision at issue here. See 2015 WL 7753406, at
*2, *5-6. The Northern District of California concluded that any
“procedural unconscionability [was] slight” because there were “various
[other] websites on which a recording artist can display his or her music
videos.” Id. at *2. Even though the plaintiff alleged that “YouTube ‘has
emerged as the dominant, outcome-determinative website for displaying
music videos,’” the existence of those alternatives defeated plaintiff’s
unconscionability arguments. Id.
Here, Plaintiffs concede there are other “social media sites like
Twitter” that serve as fora for public discussion. E.g., App’x 399-400 ¶ 17;
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see also App’x 408 ¶ 39. While Twitter, like YouTube, is undoubtedly a
“popular … website,” Darnaa, 2015 WL 7753406, at *2, Plaintiffs
obviously can go elsewhere to promote their views and engage with their
supporters. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege they have created and maintain their
own website precisely for that purpose. See App’x 398 ¶¶ 12-13. On their
American Renaissance website, Plaintiffs “disseminate facts about race and
race relations,” the same kind of material they allegedly seek to share on
Twitter. App’x 398-399 ¶¶ 12-13; App’x 406-407, ¶ 33; App’x 407 ¶ 37;
see also App’x 978-981. Because Plaintiffs have meaningful alternative
ways to disseminate their views to the public, the Twitter user agreement is
not procedurally unconscionable.
b)

Plaintiffs failed to allege causation

The Amended Complaint also failed to allege that Plaintiffs’
accounts were suspended because of the challenged “any or no reason”
provision. This independently defeats their UCL claim, as the UCL
requires Plaintiffs to show their injury was “caused by[] the unfair business
practice … that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior
Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 321-322 (2011); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Government
Payment Serv., Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 1321, 1332 (2015) (“‘there must be
a causal connection between the harm suffered and the unlawful business
activity’”). That requirement is not met when “‘a complaining party would
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suffer from the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the
law.’” Two Jinn, 233 Cal. App. 4th at 1332.
Here, the Amended Complaint plainly and repeatedly identifies
Twitter’s Violent Extremist Group Rule—and not Twitter’s contractual
right to suspend users for “any or no reason”—as the cause of their
suspension from the platform. See, e.g., App’x 419 ¶ 67 (Plaintiffs and
“other users [were] banned pursuant to the ‘Violent Extremist Group
policy’”). This allegation dominates the Amended Complaint. From the
outset, Plaintiffs allege that “Twitter banned hundreds of ‘right wing’
accounts (including those of Plaintiffs) pursuant to th[e] [Violent Extremist
Group] policy.” App’x 397 ¶ 6. They further allege that when they
appealed their suspensions, Twitter explained in writing “that the
suspensions were permanent because the accounts were ‘found to be
violating … Twitter Rules against being affiliated with a violent extremist
group.’” App’x 410-411 ¶ 45. And they concede that “Twitter cited its
policy regarding ‘Violent Extremist Groups’ as its sole ground for
permanently banning the accounts of Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated
users.” App’x 422 ¶ 74 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Indeed, the
first form of injunctive relief that the Amended Complaint demands is “that
Twitter cease and desist from enforcing its facially overbroad policy on
‘Violent Extremist Groups.’” App’x 435. The Amended Complaint makes
no such demand regarding the “any or no reason” provision.
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While the Amended Complaint references the “any or no reason”
language in passing, it does not allege that Twitter invoked or relied on that
provision in this case. Instead, it speculates about hypothetical situations in
which Twitter could rely on that provision to suspend other unidentified
users’ accounts. For example, it imagines that Twitter employees could
“ban accounts” that “belong to an ex-girlfriend or ex-boyfriend” or for
other “petty … reasons.” E.g., App’x 432-433 ¶ 103. That scenario is far
removed from Plaintiffs’ theory of the case. Additional paragraphs
referencing the “any or no reason” provision simply conjecture that Twitter
“could” or “would” be able to use the provision for what Plaintiffs’ deem
improper purposes. See, e.g., App’x 431-432 ¶ 101, 433 ¶ 104, 435 ¶ 111.
Absent any plausibly alleged causal connection between the
supposedly unconscionable provision at issue and Plaintiffs’ injury, their
UCL claim is not actionable.
c)

UCL liability cannot be predicated on a defense of
unconscionability

Finally, it was clear error for the Superior Court to sustain the UCL
claim using the defense of unconscionability as the supposed predicate for
unlawfulness. A viable claim under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong requires a
“violation of another law [as] a predicate.” Graham v. Bank of Am. N.A.,
226 Cal. App. 4th 594, 610 (2014). Here, the sole “violation of another
law” Plaintiffs put forth as a predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL was
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that aspects of Twitter’s user agreement allegedly violated the CLRA,
which provides an affirmative cause of action for damages and injunctive
relief to remedy unconscionable terms in certain types of consumer
contracts. App’x 431 ¶¶ 99-100; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a). The
Superior Court, however, stated that Twitter was “probably right” that the
FAC did not state any viable claim under the CLRA. App’x 1344.5 But the
court declined to reach that issue and instead relied on California Civil
Code § 1670.5 and the common law as supposed support for a viable claim
of unconscionability. See App’x 1335, 1344-1345.
That was clear error, because § 1670.5 and the common law—unlike
the CLRA—do not create an affirmative cause of action for
unconscionability, as the unlawful prong of the UCL requires. The
common-law “doctrine of unconscionability has historically provided only
a defense to enforcement of a contract.” California Grocers Ass’n v. Bank
of Am., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217 (1994); accord Howard v. Octagon, Inc.
2013 WL 5122191, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013); see also Rubio v.

5

As Twitter argued below, Plaintiffs failed to plead any violation of
the CLRA because the CLRA applies only to “acts or practices undertaken
by any person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or
lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)
(emphasis added). Far from alleging that they ever paid to Twitter’s
platform, which would be necessary to support a CLRA violation, the
Amended Complaint expressly acknowledges that “[a]nyone can join and
set up an account on Twitter at any time.” App’x. 399 ¶ 16.
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Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) (“ Under California
law, … unconscionability is an affirmative defense, not a cause of action.”
(citation omitted)). Because § 1670.5 “does not in itself create an
affirmative cause of action but merely codifies the [common-law] defense
of unconscionability,” it “normally cannot be used offensively to obtain
mandatory injunctive relief” absent “express” statutory authorization.
California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 217; see also, e.g., Jones v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1539 (2003) (“[T]here is no cause of
action for unconscionability under section 1670.5; that doctrine is only a
defense.”). The CLRA exemplifies such express authorization, specifically
providing that “[i]nserting an unconscionable provision in [a] contract” is
“unlawful” and making clear that a CLRA plaintiff can seek injunctive
relief. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(19), 1780(a)(1). In contrast, the UCL
does not include “express authorization of an affirmative cause of action for
unconscionability” that would justify making an exception to the general
rule. California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 218.6

6

California Grocers and Jones both assumed without deciding that
there might be a viable UCL claim under the statute’s nebulous “unfair”
prong—as opposed to the unlawful prong—but ultimately declined to grant
relief. California Grocers, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 218; Jones, 112 Cal. App.
4th at 1539-1540. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Twitter’s user
agreement constitutes an “unfair” business practice under the UCL. See
App’x. 1223-1224.
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No California state court has held that a defense of unconscionability
can provide the predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL. The Northern
District’s decision in Howard lays out the proper analysis. There, the
plaintiff attempted to invoke the UCL as an affirmative cause of action to
enjoin his former employer from invoking a mandatory arbitration
provision in his employment contract. 2013 WL 5122191, at *7. The court
rejected this argument, explaining that “[u]nconscionability is a defense to
the enforcement of a contract, not an independent cause of action.” Id.
Because the plaintiff did not rely on a discrete “statutory basis for asserting
an affirmative cause of action for unconscionability,” his UCL claim failed
as a matter of law. Id.
The same is true here. Absent a viable CLRA claim—which
Plaintiffs have not stated and cannot state—Plaintiffs cannot allege
unconscionability as the predicate for unlawfulness under the UCL.
III.

Twitter Would Suffer Irreparable Harm If The Writ Were Not
Granted And Has No Other Adequate Remedy
If the requested writ were not granted, Twitter would suffer the

irreparable harm of forever losing in this case the immunity from suit
conferred by Section 230. The fundamental purpose of an immunity from
suit is to protect a party from being “forced to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation.” Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Ct.,
133 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1189 (2005). Such immunity is “rendered
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meaningless” if the party that is supposed to be immune is instead forced to
“proceed to trial” or “face the other burdens of litigation.” Id.
Accordingly, when a demurrer based on immunity is overruled, “the
defendant asserting an immunity defense has a right to file a petition for
extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeal litigating the propriety of the
trial judge’s order.” Samuel v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 24 Cal. App. 4th
414, 423 (1994).
It is well settled that Section 230 creates immunity not only from
liability, but also from the burdens of litigation. The statute states that
“[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed”
under any state or local law that would be inconsistent with Section 230’s
broad protections for information content providers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)
(emphasis added). As the California Supreme Court has recently
reaffirmed, Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service.” Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 43 (emphasis added)
(quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329-330 (4th Cir.
1997)); see also Hassell, 5 Cal. 5th at ___, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 885
(plurality op.) (“[S]ection 230 is not just a defense to liability; it instead
confers immunity from suit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (Section 230
entitles service providers to “immunity from suit”); Nemet v.
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Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Section 230
immunity, like other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect at the
first logical point in the litigation process.”). Section 230 thus protects
online service providers “not merely from ultimate liability, but from
having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.” Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d at 1175.
Writ review is particularly necessary in cases involving erroneous
denials of immunity from suit because no other remedy is available to
correct the Superior Court’s erroneous ruling in time to avoid such
irreparable harm. Twitter cannot perfect an ordinary appeal from the
decision without a final judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 904.1; Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (“An order overruling a
demurrer is not directly appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from
the final judgment.”). And by the time a final judgment has been entered, it
would be too late. Once Twitter’s immunity from suit has been lost, it is
lost forever. See City of Stockton v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 730, 747 n.14
(2007) (finding writ review “clearly appropriate” where “[a] significant
legal issue is presented, and the benefits of the … defense would be
effectively lost if defendants were forced to go to trial”).
Moreover, if the Superior Court’s denial of immunity were left
undisturbed, it could provide a tempting model for copycat litigation—
further undermining the statutory immunity. Indeed, two such suits citing
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the ruling below as precedent have already been filed against Twitter. See
Am. Compl. ¶ 19, Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01714 (D. Ariz.
June 26, 2018), ECF No. 13; Compl. ¶¶ 45-47, Kimbrell v. Twitter, Inc.,
No. 4:18-cv-04144 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2018).
Not surprisingly, therefore, California appellate courts routinely
grant the writ in cases like this one, where the trial court overruled a
demurrer that raised an immunity defense. E.g., Big Valley Band, 133 Cal.
App. 4th at 361 (reviewing order overruling demurrer based on tribal
immunity); Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (same based on immunity
under Cal. Educ. Code § 35330); American Arb. Ass’n v. Superior Ct., 8
Cal. App. 4th 1131, 1133 (1992) (same based on arbitral immunity); Gates
v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. App. 4th 481, 487 (1995) (same based on immunity
under state tort claims act). This Court should do the same here.
IV.

The Other Traditional Factors Favor Granting The Writ
While the threat of irreparable harm alone warrants grant of the writ,

the stakes here extend beyond harm to Twitter in this particular case and
implicate several additional factors that further militate in favor of
immediate review.
First, this case involves an issue of widespread public interest. See
Brandt, 37 Cal. 3d at 816. Whether the Superior Court’s novel ruling
stands is tremendously important not only for Twitter itself, but also for
Twitter’s hundreds of millions of users and the providers and users of many
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other online platforms. E.g., App’x 397 ¶ 5. The court’s reasoning would
apply to any communications platform based in California that hosts thirdparty content. If adopted by other courts—as multiple copycat litigants
have already urged in the weeks since the court’s oral ruling, see supra p.
57—the Superior Court’s analysis would decimate those platforms’ rights
to exercise editorial judgment about the content disseminated on their
platforms, in violation of both Section 230 and the First Amendment.7
That result could deter Twitter and other such platforms from
adopting and enforcing policies that make the Internet safer for public use.
Twitter adopted the Violent Extremist Group Rule—and places other limits
on harassing and abusive conduct—to protect its users’ safety and
experience both on and off the platform. E.g., App’x 953. As the current
Twitter Rules explain, “freedom of expression and open dialogue …
mean[] little as an underlying philosophy if voices are silenced because
people are afraid to speak up.” App’x 1007. Under the Superior Court’s
reasoning, however, Twitter and other Internet-communications platforms
could find themselves unable to protect their users without assuming the
risk of costly litigation.

7

Although the Superior Court’s ruling cannot be cited in state court,
Cal. Rule of Court 8.115(a), litigants in federal district court are not under
the same restrictions, see supra p. 57. Moreover, the ruling’s analysis can
be relied upon by future state court litigants even if the ruling itself is not
citeable.
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Second, this case presents an issue of first impression for this Court,
and one on which there is a split of authority among the lower courts. See
Brandt, 37 Cal. 3d at 816; Pugliese, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1448. On July 3,
2018, the Superior Court for the County of Fresno ruled that a lawsuit
bearing similarities to the present action was barred in its entirety by both
Section 230 and the First Amendment. See Johnson v. Twitter, Inc., No.
18-CECG-00078. Like Plaintiffs here, Mr. Johnson alleged that Twitter
had impermissibly suspended his user accounts on the basis of his
“conservative political ideology, and thus discriminated against [his] free
speech” on the Twitter platform. App’x 1487. Also like Plaintiffs, Mr.
Johnson alleged that Twitter’s decision to suspend his accounts violated the
California Constitution, the Unruh Act, and the UCL. App’x 1481. Indeed,
Mr. Johnson went so far as to argue before the court in Fresno that his case
“presents “an essentially identical [UCL] claim against Twitter” as the
Plaintiffs’ UCL claim here. See Plaintiff’s Second Notice of Supplemental
Authority, Johnson, No. 18-CECG-00078 (June 15, 2018).
Thus, allowing the decision below to stand without prompt review
would subject Twitter to litigation based on novel theories that have never
been approved by any appellate court and have been rejected by other trial
courts. In contrast, by granting the writ here, the Court of Appeal can
provide guidance to aid in resolving this case and similar cases. See
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Volkswagen of Am., 94 Cal. App. 4th at 702 (granting writ review “to
provide guidance to the trial in resolving similar claims.”).
Finally, granting the writ could finally dispose of this case. If this
Court agrees that Twitter’s demurrer to the UCL claim should have been
sustained, the case will end, saving both the parties and the courts from
expending further time and resources on meritless litigation. Such
circumstances weigh in favor of granting review on a petition for a writ of
mandate. See Casterson, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 182 (petition raised issue of
first impression and resolution of the issue in defendant’s favor would
result in final disposition as to defendant); Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n,
115 Cal. App. 4th at 631-632 (writ appropriate where trial court has
improperly overruled a demurrer). Given the stakes in this case, the
importance of the legal issues, and the grave errors in the Superior Court’s
ruling, this Court should grant review.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Twitter respectfully requests that the
Court issue a writ as described in Petitioners’ Prayer. Twitter also requests
that the Court order a temporary stay of all proceedings in the Superior
Court pending final disposition of this petition.
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